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Wissenschaft­licher Mitarbeiter und Doktorand

Clemens Müller
Universität Mannheim
Fakultät für Betriebs­wirtschafts­lehre
Schloss
L9, 1–2 – Raum 510
68161 Mannheim
Sprechstunde:
nach Vereinbarung

Angels and Demons: The Negative Effect of Employees' Angel Investments on Corporate Innovation

Does a firm benefit if its employees personally invest in start-ups? To answer this question, we exploit novel data, which link angel investors in the US with their employment history. A firm's economic value of patents decreases by 3% – 5% when its employees personally invest in start-ups. We establish causality with matching and instrumental variable regressions, which rely on quasi-exogenous competition in the early-stage financing market. The negative relations­hip is stronger for angel investors in innovation-related roles, if the start-ups are more time consuming, and for exploratory patents. Compared to other angel investors, angel investors employed at corporations have a positive impact on future innovation and success of their invested start-ups. Our results indicate that angel investors divert time and effort from their employers to their personal investments. We highlight a trade-off between the benefits of angel investors for start-ups and the costs for their employer.

 

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  • Kurzprofil

    • 11.2018 – 08.2020 Wissenschaft­licher Mitarbeiter am Lehr­stuhl von Prof. Dr. Erik Theissen
    • seit 09.2017 Doktorand an der Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
    • 2014 – 2017 Master in Management Mannheim
  • Interessensgebiete

    • Entrepreneurial Finance
    • Innovation and Competition
  • Forschungs­projekte

    Angels and Demons: The Negative Effect of Employees' Angel Investments on Corporate Innovation

    Does a firm benefit if its employees personally invest in start-ups? To answer this question, we exploit novel data, which link angel investors in the US with their employment history. A firm's economic value of patents decreases by 3% – 5% when its employees personally invest in start-ups. We establish causality with matching and instrumental variable regressions, which rely on quasi-exogenous competition in the early-stage financing market. The negative relations­hip is stronger for angel investors in innovation-related roles, if the start-ups are more time consuming, and for exploratory patents. Compared to other angel investors, angel investors employed at corporations have a positive impact on future innovation and success of their invested start-ups. Our results indicate that angel investors divert time and effort from their employers to their personal investments. We highlight a trade-off between the benefits of angel investors for start-ups and the costs for their employer.