

Mannheim, November 2025

Spring Term 2026

ACC 750 Accounting Seminar

Smart Disclosure Regulation in Capital Markets: Empirical and Qualitative Findings

Lecturers: Professor Jannis Bischof/Professor Jens Wüstemann

I. Admission and Seminar Dates

We accept applications for the seminar for the fast close period until December 18, 2025, and for the final close period until February 5, 2026. Please submit the seminar registration form, Bachelor and current transcript and CV via email to Judith Greger (accounting.bwl@uni-mannheim.de). You can access the seminar registration form using one of the following links: <https://www.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/en/bischof/teaching/> or <https://www.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/en/wuestemann/teaching/>.

You must prove in your application that you fulfill the prerequisites. The necessary prerequisites for participation include the successful completion of at least **one** of the following classes: ACC 510, ACC 520, ACC 530, ACC 540, ACC 560, ACC/TAX 570. Please highlight the respective class in your transcript and note it on the seminar registration form. If the class grades have not been published yet, you can still apply for the seminar. However, you must hand in the grade later as your admission to the seminar is conditional on the successful completion of the course.

For the seminar writing phase, you can choose between two eight-week periods: the fast close period spans from January 2, 2026, to February 27, 2026, and the final close period from February 16, 2026, to April 13, 2026. Please indicate in which period you intend to write your seminar thesis in your registration document. We will publish the allocation of paper topics **via email** on January 2, 2026, and on February 16, 2026, respectively (at noon, 12 pm).

We will send out admission emails for the fast close period on December 19, 2025, and for the final close period on February 12, 2026. **If you wish to withdraw from the seminar, please respond to the admission email for the fast close period until December 20, 2025, and the final close period until**

February 13, 2026. If we do not receive a response, we will consider this as confirmation of your attendance. The seminar presentations will take place on **April 17, 2026** (Changed date!).

II. Seminar Paper and Presentation

1. Motivation & Preliminary Remarks

Across a wide range of policy domains, regulatory activity has expanded significantly in recent years. Within this development, disclosure regulation has emerged as a central regulatory instrument. In its conventional form, disclosure regulation seeks to remedy market failures arising from insufficient information and to protect market participants by enabling informed decision-making. Recent developments may change both *which* disclosures are regulated and *how* regulation is designed. As externalities gain prominence, disclosure is increasingly used in contexts where more direct policies (e.g., emissions caps or taxes) are politically infeasible. In such cases, disclosure seeks to not only inform stakeholders but also steer corporate behavior. At the same time, recent advances in AI and machine learning are reshaping how information is processed, making the effectiveness of disclosure rules more dependent on standardization and machine-readability.

With these developments, new questions arise concerning how such regimes are created, how they balance benefits and costs, and how they ultimately function within the broader market landscape. First, designing disclosure regulation is challenging because many different actors pursue different interests. Companies, investors, and civil society groups, for example, can have very different preferences regarding what should be disclosed and for what purpose, politicizing the content and design of disclosure rules. Policymakers – within and across countries – can also pursue different regulatory agendas, which can lead to inconsistent or fragmented rules. At the same time, private standard setters have become increasingly influential. Their growing role potentially blurs the boundary between public regulation and private initiatives and can lead to competing or overlapping standards.

Second, the design of disclosure regulation determines the extent to which costs are balanced against the benefits. For example, contemporary capital-market and ESG regulation often relies on highly detailed, rules-based reporting requirements intended to minimize managerial discretion and enhance legal certainty. Yet excessive granularity can produce the opposite effect, leading to complexity and opacity rather than clarity and generating substantial compliance burdens. Principles-based frameworks are often proposed as a corrective, but where the underlying principles lack substance, they may merely shift the interpretative burden onto reporting entities and increase reliance on professional judgment. In addition, the mandatory disclosure of information may entail significant indirect costs associated with the revelation of commercially sensitive information. In response to such concerns, a number of initiatives have begun to reassess the scope and intensity of disclosure obligations. The recent EU's Omnibus initiative, for instance, introduces targeted relief measures aimed at recalibrating ESG-related reporting requirements.

Third, market forces and their interplay with other policies shape how effectively disclosure regulation translates into real effects. Disclosure regulation may generate value only if the information is useful to its intended audiences. If relevant market forces are absent or disclosure rules are not aligned with related policies, their impact may be limited.

Against this backdrop, the seminar adopts a multidimensional perspective on disclosure regulation. It examines how regulatory frameworks are created, how they can be designed to be proportionate and adaptive, and how their informational and behavioral effects can be maximized. The seminar seeks to provide evidence-based perspectives on these questions. It follows a twofold approach: qualitatively, by treating law itself as evidence, and quantitatively, by exploring contemporary regulatory, market and corporate practices. By combining both perspectives, the seminar aims to generate well-founded insights into the creation, design and effects of disclosure regulation.

For further insights and in general preparation for the seminar session, we recommend reading the following publications:

- Becker, K., Bischof, J., & Daske, H. (2021). IFRS: Markets, Practice, and Politics. Chapter 5: The Political Economy of IFRS (pp. 148-179). *Foundations and Trends® in Accounting*, 15(1–2), 1-262.
- Fung, A., Graham, M., & Weil, D. (2007). Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency. Chapter 4: What Makes Transparency Work? (pp. 50-105). *Cambridge University Press*.
- Leuz, C., & Wysocki, P. D. (2016). The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 54(2), 525-622.
- Wagenhofer, A. (2024). Sustainability Reporting: A Financial Reporting Perspective. *Accounting in Europe*, 21(1), 1-13.
- Wüstemann/Bischof/Wüstemann (2012), The Economics of Private Law. Consequences of the Choice and Application of Accounting Standards from Institutional, Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, in: Privates Recht, Christian Bumke et al. (eds.), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2012, pp. 157–186.

2. Topics and Related Literature

Part A: Smart in Creation? The Role of Different Actors In Shaping Regulatory Development

- **Topic 1:** “Lobbying and EU Disclosure Regulation: Navigating the Fine Line Between Consultation and Capture / Lobbyismus und EU-Offenlegungsvorschriften: Der schmale Grat zwischen Konsultation und Vereinnahmung“ (Supervisor: *Friederike Lötters*)
 - Ahn, C., Houston, J. F., & Kim, S. (2025). Hidden in Plain Sight: The Role of Corporate Board of Directors in Public Charity Lobbying. *Management Science*.
 - Becker, K., Bischof, J., & Daske, H. (2021). IFRS: Markets, Practice, and Politics. Chapter 5: The Political Economy of IFRS (pp. 148-179). *Foundations and Trends® in Accounting*, 15(1–2), 1-262.
 - Bischof, J., Daske, H., & Sextroh, C. J. (2020). Why do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 58(3), 589-642.
 - Christensen, D. M., Jin, H., Lee, J. A., Sridharan, S. A., & Wellman, L. A. (2024). Corporate Political Activism and Information Transfers. *The Accounting Review*, 99(3), 87-113.
 - Monsen, B. R. (2022). The Determinants and Consequences of Big 4 Lobbying Positions on Proposed Financial Accounting Standards. *The Accounting Review*, 97(3), 309-341.
- **Topic 2:** “Critical Assessment of the Role of Geographic Fragmentation in Disclosure Regulation / Kritische Würdigung der Rolle geografischer Fragmentierung in den Offenlegungspflichten” (Supervisor: *Frederik Kohl*)
 - Breuer, M., & Breuer, P. (2023). Uneven Regulation and Economic Reallocation: Evidence from Transparency Regulation. *Working Paper*.
 - Cascino, S., & Correia, M. (2025). Behind the Corporate Veil: How Business Groups Arbitrage ESG Disclosure Mandates. *Working Paper*.
 - Rauter, T. (2020). The Effect of Mandatory Extraction Payment Disclosures on Corporate Payment and Investment Policies Abroad. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 58(5), 1075-1116.
- **Topic 3:** “Critical Assessment of the Incorporation of Private Standards into European Sustainability Reporting Using the Example of CO2 Disclosure Requirements under ESRS E1 with Particular Consideration of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol / Kritische Würdigung der Inkorporation privater Standards in die europäische Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung am Beispiel der CO2-Berichtspflichten nach ESRS E1 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Greenhouse Gas Protokolls” (Supervisor: *Franziska Büchner*)
 - Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2772 of 31 July 2023 supplementing Directive 2013/34/EU as regards sustainability reporting standards. ABIEU, Nr. L 2023/2772 of 22.12.2023, S. 1-284, here: ESRS E1 Climate Change, S. 72-110.

- Hoppmann, V. (2025). Verantwortung von Unternehmen für Treibhausgasemissionen: Direkte (Scope 1) und indirekte (Scope 2 und 3) Emissionen im Recht. *ZEuP* 33(3), 526-557.
- Reichelstein, S. (2024). Corporate Carbon Accounting: Balance Sheets and Flow Statements. *Review of Accounting Studies* 29(3), 2125–2156.
- Wagenhofer, A. (2024). Sustainability Reporting: A Financial Reporting Perspective. *Accounting in Europe* 21(1), 1-13.

Part B: Smart in Design? The Role of Standardization and Regulatory Scope

- **Topic 4:** “Do We Still Need Structured Reports? The Impact of AI-extracted Disclosure on Information Acquisition Speed and Market Efficiency / Brauchen wir noch strukturierte Berichte? Die Auswirkungen KI-extrahierter Offenlegung auf die Geschwindigkeit der Informationsverarbeitung und die Markteffizienz” (Supervisor: *Daniela Zipperer*)
 - Becker, K., Bischof, J., & Daske, H. (2021). IFRS: Markets, Practice, and Politics. Chapter 4.4: Digital Reporting Using Tagged Reports (pp. 133-144). *Foundations and Trends® in Accounting*, 15(1–2), 1-262.
 - Blankespoor, E., Miller, B. P., & White, H. D. (2014). Initial Evidence on the Market Impact of the XBRL Mandate. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 19(4), 1468-1503.
 - Elliott, W. B., Hobson, J. L., & White, B. J. (2015). Earnings Metrics, Information Processing, and Price Efficiency in Laboratory Markets. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 53(3), 555-592.
 - Verrecchia, R. E. (1980). Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market Information Efficiency. *The American Economic Review*, 70(5), 874-884.
- **Topic 5:** “Over-Regulation or Necessary Precision? Critical Assessment of the IASB Amendments to IFRS 9 for Nature-Dependent Electricity Contracts (Power Purchase Agreements) / Überregulierung oder notwendige Konkretisierung? Kritische Würdigung der IASB-Änderungen an IFRS 9 im Hinblick auf naturabhängige Stromlieferverträge (Power Purchase Agreements)” (Supervisor: *Leonie Baumann*)
 - Becker, K & Kropp, M. (2024). Bilanzierung derivativer Finanzinstrumente und Sicherungsbeziehungen nach IFRS. Handbuch des Jahresabschlusses hrsg. v. Schulze-Osterloh et al., 85. Lieferung, Köln.
 - IASB (2024): IFRS Amendments to IFRS 9 and IFRS 7 (Contracts Referencing Nature-dependent Electricity). London.
 - Wüstemann, J. & Wüstemann, S. (2020). Substance and Form. An Interdisciplinary Inquiry, Working Paper, Universität Mannheim.
- **Topic 6:** “How Much Judgement Is Intended? Critical Assessment of the IASB’s Discussion on the Design of the IAS 36 Impairment Test / Wie viel Ermessen ist zweckadäquat? Kritische Würdigung der IASB-Diskussion zur Ausgestaltung des Wertminderungstests nach IAS 36” (Supervisor: *Leonie Baumann*)

- IASB (2020). Discussion Paper DP/2020/1 Business Combinations - Disclosures, Goodwill and Impairment. London.
- Hennrichs, J. (2009). Bilanzierung und Bewertung eines Geschäfts- oder Firmenwerts nach BilMoG, Steuerbilanzrecht und IFRS. FS Schaumburg, hrsg. v. Wolfgang Spindler et al.. Köln, 367-386.
- Wüstemann, J. & Wüstemann, S. (2010). Why Consistency of Accounting Standards Matters: A Contribution to the Rules-Versus-Principles Debate in Financial Reporting. *Abacus* 46(1), 1-27.
- **Topic 7:** “Critical Assessment of the Role of Financial Reporting Frequency / Kritische Würdigung der Rolle der Häufigkeit finanzieller Berichterstattung” (Supervisor: *Frederik Kohl*)
 - Gigler, F., Kanodia, C., Sapra, H., & Venugopalan, R. (2014). How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short-Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency. *Journal of Accounting Research* 52(2), 357–387.
 - Kajüter, P., Klassmann, F., & Nienhaus M. (2019). The Effect of Mandatory Quarterly Reporting on Firm Value. *The Accounting Review* 94(3), 251–277.
 - Kraft, A., Vashishtha, R., & Venkatachalam, M. (2018). Frequent Financial Reporting and Managerial Myopia. *The Accounting Review* 93(2), 249–275.
 - Sarif, S., & De George, E. (2020). The Dark Side of Low Financial Reporting Frequency: Investors’ Reliance on Alternative Sources of Earnings News and Excessive Information Spillovers. *The Accounting Review* 95(6), 23–49.
- **Topic 8:** “Mandatory Disclosure with Managerial Discretion: Evidence from Risk-Factor Disclosures / Pflichtoffenlegung und unternehmerischer Ermessensspielraum: Evidenz aus Risikofaktor-Berichten” (Supervisor: *Nils Schödel*)
 - Bischof, J., Daske, H. (2013) Mandatory Disclosure, Voluntary Disclosure, and Stock Market Liquidity: Evidence from the EU Bank Stress Tests. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 51(5), 997-1029.
 - Campbell, J. L., Chen, H., Dhaliwal, D. S., Lu, H., & Steele, L. B. (2014). The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor Disclosures in Corporate Filings. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 19(1).
 - Kravet, T., & Muslu, V. (2013). Textual Risk Disclosures and Investors’ Risk Perceptions. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 18(4), 1088–1122.
 - Matsumura, E. M., Prakash, R., & Vera-Muñoz, S. C. (2014). Firm-Value Effects of Carbon Emissions and Carbon Disclosures. *The Accounting Review*, 89(2), 695–724.
- **Topic 9:** “Critical assessment of the Value Chain Concept under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) with particular consideration of the planned relief measures within the Omnibus Initiative / Kritische Würdigung des Wertschöpfungskettenbegriffs der Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung geplanter Entlastungen im Rahmen der Omnibus Initiative” (Supervisor: *Franziska Büchner*)

- COM (2025) 81: Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements.
- EFRAG (2024). EFRAG IG 2: Value Chain Implementation Guidance. Brüssel.
- Wagenhöfer, A. (2024). Sustainability Reporting: A Financial Reporting Perspective. *Accounting in Europe* 21(1), 1-13.
- Wüstemann, J. & Büchner, F. (2024), Das Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz: Pflichten und Verantwortung von Unternehmen – Eine kritische Würdigung. *BB 79*(11), 579-585.

Part C: Smart in Information and Policy Value? The Role of Disclosure in Markets

- **Topic 10:** “What Moves the Needle? Comparing the Economic Effects of Regulating Product-versus Issuer-Level Disclosures / Welche Regulierung macht den Unterschied? Ein Vergleich der ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Regulierung produktbezogener gegenüber auf Unternehmensebene erfolgreicher Offenlegungen” (Supervisor: *Gerrit von Zedlitz*)
 - Ball, R. (2024). By What Criteria Do We Evaluate Accounting? Some Thoughts on Economic Welfare and the Archival Literature. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 62(1), 7-54.
 - Bourveau, T., Lauer, C., & Zipperer, D. (2025). Stock Market Reaction to Product-Level Carbon Estimates. *Working Paper*.
 - Christensen, H. B. (2022). Is Corporate Transparency the Solution to Political Failure on our Greatest Problems? A Discussion of Darendeli, Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann (2022). *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 74(2-3), 101542.
 - Leonelli, S., Muhn, M., Rauter, T., & Sran, G. (2025). How Do Consumers Use ESG Disclosure? Evidence From a Randomized Field Experiment With Everyday Product Purchases. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 101811.
- **Topic 11:** “Talking Green or Acting Green under Sustainability Regulation: The Role of Market Pressure / Grün reden oder grün handeln zur Befolgung von Nachhaltigkeitsvorschriften? Die Rolle des Marktdrucks” (Supervisor: *Yuhan Liu*)
 - Basu, S., Vitanza, J., Wang, W., & Zhu, X. R. (2022). Walking the Walk? Bank ESG Disclosures and Home Mortgage Lending. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 27(3), 779-821.
 - Cho, C. H., & Patten, D. M. (2007). The Role of Environmental Disclosures as Tools of Legitimacy: A Research Note. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 32(7-8), 639-647.
 - Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021). Mandatory CSR and Sustainability Reporting: Economic Analysis and Literature Review. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 26(3), 1176-1248.
 - Matsumura, E. M., Prakash, R., & Vera-Muñoz, S. C. (2014). Firm-value Effects of Carbon Emissions and Carbon Disclosures. *The Accounting Review*, 89(2), 695-724.

- **Topic 12:** “Amplifier or Attenuator? How Disclosure Regulation Shapes Capital-Market Reactions to Carbon Pricing / Verstärker oder Abschwächer? Wie Offenlegungspflichten Kapitalmarktreaktionen auf CO₂-Bepreisung beeinflussen” (Supervisor: Gerrit von Zedlitz)
 - Downar, B., Ernstberger, J., Reichelstein, S., Schwenen, S., & Zaklan, A. (2021). The Impact of Carbon Disclosure Mandates on Emissions and Financial Operating Performance. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 26(3), 1137-1175.
 - Hail, L., Muhn, M., & Oesch, D. (2021). Do Risk Disclosures Matter When It Counts? Evidence from the Swiss Franc Shock. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 59(1), 283-330.
 - Krueger, P., Sautner, Z., & Starks, L. T. (2020). The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 33(3), 1067-1111.
 - Martinsson, G., Sajtos, L., Strömberg, P., & Thomann, C. (2024). The Effect of Carbon Pricing on Firm Emissions: Evidence from the Swedish CO₂ tax. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 37(6), 1848-1886.

III. Administration and General Information

1. Supervision

In general, you should contact your assigned supervisor shortly after the allocation of topics to discuss the general direction of your topic and the principles of writing an academic seminar paper. In addition, we expect that you present and discuss the structure and content of your term paper at one or two more meetings with your supervisor. Please check the list of topics and the chair's website for information on how to contact your supervisor.

2. Formal Guidelines

Please check the "Guidelines for Academic Writing" („Richtlinien für die Anfertigung wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten“), which are available for download on the relevant chair's website. Please note that students in the English-track of the MMM program must write their seminar papers in English. In general, seminar papers consist of 14 to 16 text pages, excluding indices and appendices. You should start your paper with a clear and concise introduction that motivates the topic and derives the main research question of your paper. The introduction should be approximately 1-1.5 pages in length and conclude with a short outline of the course of your study. Accordingly, your seminar thesis shall end with a conclusion that summarizes the main findings of your paper. You can find further details in the "Guidelines for Academic Writing".

3. Submission of Seminar Papers and Presentations

Please submit two printed copies of your written seminar thesis to Silke Frankl (office assistant to Prof. Wüstemann) or Judith Greger (office assistant to Prof. Bischof) during the regular office hours. Seminar papers must not be bounded by hard- or paperback; stapled copies are sufficient. In addition, please submit a digital version of your paper to your supervisor. The digital version shall include, if applicable, all relevant digital content of your thesis (such as MS Excel files, internet resources, etc.). Seminar papers need to be submitted by noon on the ending date of either the fast or final close period (*vide supra*). Extensions of the submission deadline are only possible by the examination regulation if you can present a medical certificate. Please note that extending the working period beyond the date scheduled for the seminar presentations is impossible. In addition to the written seminar thesis, you must prepare a presentation based on your submitted seminar paper. The language of the presentation is English. Details on the content and structure of your presentations will be available from your supervisors only after the submission of your written papers. The presentation slides must be handed in on April 26, 2026 (midnight), at the very latest. More information will follow.

4. Grading

Grading is based on the written paper (60%), the presentation and active seminar participation (40%). Attendance at all seminar sessions is mandatory, and all participants are expected to participate in the seminar discussions.

5. *Seminar Preparation and Materials*

To effectively prepare for the seminar and the discussions, we will send all participants relevant introductory literature and the final presentations via ILIAS or email. We will also announce the availability of additional material in due time.

6. *Examiner/Supervisor*

The students will be examined / supervised by the following Professor / Research Assistant:

Topic 1 (part A)	Prof. Bischof / Friederike Lötters
Topic 2 (part A)	Prof. Wüstemann / Frederik Kohl
Topic 3 (part A)	Prof. Wüstemann / Franziska Büchner
Topic 4 (part B)	Prof. Bischof / Daniela Zipperer
Topic 5 (part B)	Prof. Wüstemann / Leonie Baumann
Topic 6 (part B)	Prof. Wüstemann / Leonie Baumann
Topic 7 (part B)	Prof. Wüstemann / Frederik Kohl
Topic 8 (part B)	Prof. Bischof / Nils Schödel
Topic 9 (part B)	Prof. Wüstemann / Franziska Büchner
Topic 10 (part C)	Prof. Bischof / Gerrit von Zedlitz
Topic 11 (part C)	Prof. Bischof / Yuhan Liu
Topic 12 (part C)	Prof. Bischof / Gerrit von Zedlitz