Ernst Maug has been professor for Corporate Finance at the University of Mannheim Business School since February 2006. He served the school as Associate Dean for Research and director of the business school’s doctoral programs. He is president-elect of the European Finance Association. Before, he taught at the Department of Business and Economics at Humboldt University (Berlin, 2000 to 2006), the Fuqua School of Business (Duke University, 1996 to 2000), and the London Business School (1993 to 1996). Professor Maug was visiting professor at the University of New South Wales and Duke University, and the London School of Economics, from where he obtained his Ph.D. in 1993.
Professor Maug’s main research interest is in corporate finance with a particular emphasis on corporate governance. Recent work focuses on the interface between financial markets and labor markets. His prior research analyzes executive compensation contracts, the role of blockholders, the corporate boards, and shareholder voting. His research was published in the American Economic Review, the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Review of Financial Studies, and other journals and has won several prizes.
Publications
- Levit, D., Malenko, N. and Maug, E. (2024). Trading and shareholder democracy. The Journal of Finance, 79, 257–304.
- Li, S. Z., Maug, E. and Schwartz-Ziv, M. (2021). When shareholders disagree: Trading after shareholder meetings. The Review of Financial Studies, 35, 1–71.
- Klein, D. and Maug, E. (2020). How do executives exercise their stock options? The Review of Corporate Finance Studies : RCFS, 9, 302–339.
- Antoni, M., Maug, E. and Obernberger, S. (2019). Private equity and human capital risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 133, 634–657.
- Kim, E H., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2018). Labor representation in governance as an insurance mechanism. Review of Finance, 22, 1251-1289.
- Focke, F., Maug, E. and Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2017). CEOs earn less at more-prestigious firms. Harvard Business Review : HBR, 2017, 2–4.
- Focke, F., Maug, E. and Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2017). The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 123, 313–336.
- Klein, O., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2017). Trading strategies of corporate insiders. Journal of Financial Markets, 34, 48–68.
- Hillert, A., Maug, E. and Obernberger, S. (2016). Stock repurchases and liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics, 119, 186–209.
- Dittmann, I., Kübler, D., Maug, E. and Mechtenberg, L. (2014). Why votes have value : instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors. Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 17–38.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Spalt, O. (2013). Indexing executive compensation contracts. The Review of Financial Studies, 26, 3182-3224.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Zhang, D. (2011). Restricting CEO Pay. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1200-1220.
- Maug, E. and Albrecht, B. (2011). Struktur und Höhe der Vorstandsvergütung : Fakten und Mythen. Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung : Zfbf, 63, 858–881.
- Maug, E. and Naik, N. (2011). Herding and delegated portfolio management : the impact of relative performance evaluation on asset allocation. The Quarterly Journal of Finance : QJF, 1, 265–292.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2010). Bankers on the boards of German firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there? Review of Finance, 14, 35–71.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Spalt, O. (2010). Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse. The Journal of Finance, 65, 2015–2050.
- Güth, W., Kröger, S. and Maug, E. (2009). Bargaining under large risk – an experimental analysis. New Zealand Economic Papers, 43, 105–129.
- Maug, E. and Rydqvist, K. (2009). Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposals screening, and majority rules. Review of Finance, 13, 47–79.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2008). How Preussag Became TUI: A Clinical Study of Institutional Blockholders and Restructuring in Europe. Financial Management, 37, 571–598.
- Dittmann, I. and Maug, E. (2007). Lower Salaries and No Options: The Optimal Structure of Executive Pay. The Journal of Finance, 62, 303–343.
- Güth, W. and Maug, E. (2007). Who Volunteers? A Theory of Firms Allowing for Intrinsically Motivated Agents. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft : ZfB, 77, 49–74.
- Maug, E. (2006). Efficiency and fairness in minority freezeouts: Takeovers, overbidding, and the freeze-in problem. International Review of Law and Economics, 26, 355–379.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Kemper, J. (2004). How fundamental are fundamental values? Valuation methods and their impact on the performance of German venture capitalists. European Financial Management, 10, 609–638.
- Maug, E. (2002). Insider trading legislation and corporate governance. European Economic Review : EER, 46, 1569-1597.
- Maug, E. and Yilmaz, B. (2002). Two-class voting : a mechanism for conflict resolution in bankruptcy? American Economic Review : AER, 92, 1448-1471.
- Maug, E. (2001). Ownership structure and the life-cycle of the firm : a theory of the decision to go public. European Finance Review, 5, 167–200.
- Maug, E. (2000). The relative performance puzzle. Schmalenbach Business Review : Sbr, 52, 3–24.
- Maug, E. (1998). Large shareholders as monitors : is there a trade-off between liquidity and control? The Journal of Finance, 53, 65–98.
- Maug, E. (1997). Boards of directors and capital structure : alternative forms of corporate restructuring. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3, 113–139.
- Maug, E. (1996). Corporate control and the market for managerial labour : on the decision to go public. European Economic Review : EER, 40, 1049-1056.
- Gong, M., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2024). Arbitraging labor markets.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 997/
2024. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - Gehrke, B., Maug, E., Obernberger, S. and Schneider, C. (2021). Post-merger restructuring of the labor force.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 753/
2021. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - Levit, D., Malenko, N. and Maug, E. (2021). The voting premium.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 720/
2021. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - García-Gómez, P., Maug, E. and Obernberger, S. (2020). Private equity buyouts and employee health.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 680/
2020. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - Levit, D., Malenko, N. and Maug, E. (2019). Trading and Shareholder Democracy.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 631/
2019. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - Levit, D., Malenko, N. and Maug, E. (2019). Trading and shareholder voting. ECGI Finance Working Paper, 631. Bruxelles: European Corp. Governance Inst.
- Levit, D., Malenko, N. and Maug, E. (2019). Trading and shareholder voting. CEPR Discussion Paper, 14039. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
- Li, S. Z., Maug, E. and Schwartz-Ziv, M. (2019). When shareholders disagree: Trading after shareholder meetings. ECGI Finance Working Paper, 594. Bruxelles: European Corp. Governance Inst.
- Antoni, M., Maug, E. and Obernberger, S. (2017). Private equity and human capital risk. ECGI Finance Working Paper, 518. Brussels [u.a.]: European Corp. Governance Inst.
- Hillert, A., Maug, E. and Obernberger, S. (2013). Stock Repurchases and Market Liquidity. Mannheim.
- Dittmann, I., Zhang, D., Maug, E. and Spalt, O. (2011). Note on the calibration of executive compensation models. SSRN Electronic Journal. Rochester, NY [u.a.].
- Daske, H., Maug, E. and van Halteren, J. (2010). Evaluating Methods to Estimate the Implied Cost of Equity Capital: A Simulation Study. Rochester, NY.
- Dittmann, I., Kübler, D., Maug, E. and Mechtenberg, L. (2010). Why Votes have a Value. Rochester, NY.
- Klein, D. and Maug, E. (2010). How do executives exercise their stock options? Rochester, NY.
- Lebedeva, O., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2009). Stealth Trading by Corporate Insiders. Rochester, NY.
- Maug, E., Dittmann, I. and Schneider, C. (2009). Bankers and the performance of German firms. None.
- Dittmann, I. and Maug, E. (2008). Biases and Error Measures: How to Compare Valuation Methods. Rochester, NY.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2008). Bankers on the boards of German firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there?
ECGI Finance Working Paper, 196/
2008. Bruxelles: European Corp. Governance Inst. - Dittmann, I. and Maug, E. (2007). Valuation biases, error measures, and the conglomerate discount. Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung, 07–37. Mannheim.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2007). How Preussag became TUI : kissing too many toads can make you a toad. None.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Spalt, O. (2007). Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse. Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung, 07–36. Mannheim.
- Maug, E. and Dittmann, I. (2007). Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay. None.
- Maug, E., van Halteren, J. and Ackerman, A. (2007). Insider trading legislation and acquisition announcements : do laws matter? Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung, 07–34. Mannheim.
- Maug, E. and Rydqvist, K. (2007). Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposals screening, and majority rules. Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung, 07–35. Mannheim.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Spalt, O. (2006). Executive stock options when managers are loss-averse. Mannheim.
- Degeorge, F. and Maug, E. (2008). Corporate finance in Europe : a survey. In Handbook of European financial markets and institutions (S. 217–237). Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press.
- Dittmann, I. and Maug, E. (2005). Warum optimale Anreizverträge keine Optionen enthalten. In Funktionsfähigkeit und Stabilität von Finanzmärkten (S. 1–20). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.