Bild: Siegfried Herrmann
Ernst Maug ist bereits seit Februar 2006 Professor für Corporate Finance der Fakultät für BWL der Universität Mannheim. Während seiner Zeit an der Universität Mannheim arbeitete er als Prodekan für Forschung und war Vorsitzender des Promotionsstudiengangs der Fakultät für BWL. Er ist Präsident der European Finance Association.
Bevor er seinem Ruf an die Universität Mannheim folgte, lehrte er an der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (2000–2006), der Fuqua School of Business der Duke University (1996-2000) und der London Business School (1993-1996). Professor Maug war Gastdozent an der University of New South Wales, der Duke University und der London School of Economics, an welcher er 1993 seinen PhD absolvierte.
Professor Maugs Forschung konzentriert sich hauptsächlich auf das Fachgebiet Corporate Finance wobei ein besonderer Forschungsschwerpunkt auf der Rolle der Unternehmensführung liegt. Jüngste Arbeiten betrachten die Schnittstelle zwischen Kapital- und Arbeitsmärkten. Frühere Forschungsarbeiten analysieren die Vergütung von Führungskräften, die Rolle von Großaktionären und Aufsichtsräten und Aktionärsabstimmungen.
Seine Arbeit wurde in der American Economic Review, dem Journal of Finance, dem Journal of Financial Economics, der Review of Financial Studies und in anderen Journals veröffentlicht und gewann zahlreiche Preise.
Publikationen
- Levit, D., Malenko, N. und Maug, E. (2024). Trading and shareholder democracy. The Journal of Finance, 79, 257–304.
- Li, S. Z., Maug, E. und Schwartz-Ziv, M. (2021). When shareholders disagree: Trading after shareholder meetings. The Review of Financial Studies, 35, 1–71.
- Klein, D. und Maug, E. (2020). How do executives exercise their stock options? The Review of Corporate Finance Studies : RCFS, 9, 302–339.
- Antoni, M., Maug, E. und Obernberger, S. (2019). Private equity and human capital risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 133, 634–657.
- Kim, E H., Maug, E. und Schneider, C. (2018). Labor representation in governance as an insurance mechanism. Review of Finance, 22, 1251-1289.
- Focke, F., Maug, E. und Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2017). CEOs earn less at more-prestigious firms. Harvard Business Review : HBR, 2017, 2–4.
- Focke, F., Maug, E. und Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2017). The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 123, 313–336.
- Klein, O., Maug, E. und Schneider, C. (2017). Trading strategies of corporate insiders. Journal of Financial Markets, 34, 48–68.
- Hillert, A., Maug, E. und Obernberger, S. (2016). Stock repurchases and liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics, 119, 186–209.
- Dittmann, I., Kübler, D., Maug, E. und Mechtenberg, L. (2014). Why votes have value : instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors. Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 17–38.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Spalt, O. (2013). Indexing executive compensation contracts. The Review of Financial Studies, 26, 3182-3224.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Zhang, D. (2011). Restricting CEO Pay. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1200-1220.
- Maug, E. und Albrecht, B. (2011). Struktur und Höhe der Vorstandsvergütung : Fakten und Mythen. Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung : Zfbf, 63, 858–881.
- Maug, E. und Naik, N. (2011). Herding and delegated portfolio management : the impact of relative performance evaluation on asset allocation. The Quarterly Journal of Finance : QJF, 1, 265–292.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Schneider, C. (2010). Bankers on the boards of German firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there? Review of Finance, 14, 35–71.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Spalt, O. (2010). Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse. The Journal of Finance, 65, 2015–2050.
- Güth, W., Kröger, S. und Maug, E. (2009). Bargaining under large risk – an experimental analysis. New Zealand Economic Papers, 43, 105–129.
- Maug, E. und Rydqvist, K. (2009). Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposals screening, and majority rules. Review of Finance, 13, 47–79.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Schneider, C. (2008). How Preussag Became TUI: A Clinical Study of Institutional Blockholders and Restructuring in Europe. Financial Management, 37, 571–598.
- Dittmann, I. und Maug, E. (2007). Lower Salaries and No Options: The Optimal Structure of Executive Pay. The Journal of Finance, 62, 303–343.
- Güth, W. und Maug, E. (2007). Who Volunteers? A Theory of Firms Allowing for Intrinsically Motivated Agents. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft : ZfB, 77, 49–74.
- Maug, E. (2006). Efficiency and fairness in minority freezeouts: Takeovers, overbidding, and the freeze-in problem. International Review of Law and Economics, 26, 355–379.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Kemper, J. (2004). How fundamental are fundamental values? Valuation methods and their impact on the performance of German venture capitalists. European Financial Management, 10, 609–638.
- Maug, E. (2002). Insider trading legislation and corporate governance. European Economic Review : EER, 46, 1569-1597.
- Maug, E. und Yilmaz, B. (2002). Two-class voting : a mechanism for conflict resolution in bankruptcy? American Economic Review : AER, 92, 1448-1471.
- Maug, E. (2001). Ownership structure and the life-cycle of the firm : a theory of the decision to go public. European Finance Review, 5, 167–200.
- Maug, E. (2000). The relative performance puzzle. Schmalenbach Business Review : Sbr, 52, 3–24.
- Maug, E. (1998). Large shareholders as monitors : is there a trade-off between liquidity and control? The Journal of Finance, 53, 65–98.
- Maug, E. (1997). Boards of directors and capital structure : alternative forms of corporate restructuring. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3, 113–139.
- Maug, E. (1996). Corporate control and the market for managerial labour : on the decision to go public. European Economic Review : EER, 40, 1049-1056.
- Gong, M., Maug, E. und Schneider, C. (2024). Arbitraging labor markets.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 997/
2024. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - Gehrke, B., Maug, E., Obernberger, S. und Schneider, C. (2021). Post-merger restructuring of the labor force.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 753/
2021. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - Levit, D., Malenko, N. und Maug, E. (2021). The voting premium.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 720/
2021. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - García-Gómez, P., Maug, E. und Obernberger, S. (2020). Private equity buyouts and employee health.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 680/
2020. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - Levit, D., Malenko, N. und Maug, E. (2019). Trading and Shareholder Democracy.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 631/
2019. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). - Levit, D., Malenko, N. und Maug, E. (2019). Trading and shareholder voting. ECGI Finance Working Paper, 631. Bruxelles: European Corp. Governance Inst.
- Levit, D., Malenko, N. und Maug, E. (2019). Trading and shareholder voting. CEPR Discussion Paper, 14039. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
- Li, S. Z., Maug, E. und Schwartz-Ziv, M. (2019). When shareholders disagree: Trading after shareholder meetings. ECGI Finance Working Paper, 594. Bruxelles: European Corp. Governance Inst.
- Antoni, M., Maug, E. und Obernberger, S. (2017). Private equity and human capital risk. ECGI Finance Working Paper, 518. Brussels [u.a.]: European Corp. Governance Inst.
- Hillert, A., Maug, E. und Obernberger, S. (2013). Stock Repurchases and Market Liquidity. Mannheim.
- Dittmann, I., Zhang, D., Maug, E. und Spalt, O. (2011). Note on the calibration of executive compensation models. SSRN Electronic Journal. Rochester, NY [u.a.].
- Daske, H., Maug, E. und van Halteren, J. (2010). Evaluating Methods to Estimate the Implied Cost of Equity Capital: A Simulation Study. Rochester, NY.
- Dittmann, I., Kübler, D., Maug, E. und Mechtenberg, L. (2010). Why Votes have a Value. Rochester, NY.
- Klein, D. und Maug, E. (2010). How do executives exercise their stock options? Rochester, NY.
- Lebedeva, O., Maug, E. und Schneider, C. (2009). Stealth Trading by Corporate Insiders. Rochester, NY.
- Maug, E., Dittmann, I. und Schneider, C. (2009). Bankers and the performance of German firms. None.
- Dittmann, I. und Maug, E. (2008). Biases and Error Measures: How to Compare Valuation Methods. Rochester, NY.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Schneider, C. (2008). Bankers on the boards of German firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there?
ECGI Finance Working Paper, 196/
2008. Bruxelles: European Corp. Governance Inst. - Dittmann, I. und Maug, E. (2007). Valuation biases, error measures, and the conglomerate discount. Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung, 07–37. Mannheim.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Schneider, C. (2007). How Preussag became TUI : kissing too many toads can make you a toad. None.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Spalt, O. (2007). Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse. Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung, 07–36. Mannheim.
- Maug, E. und Dittmann, I. (2007). Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay. None.
- Maug, E., van Halteren, J. und Ackerman, A. (2007). Insider trading legislation and acquisition announcements : do laws matter? Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung, 07–34. Mannheim.
- Maug, E. und Rydqvist, K. (2007). Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposals screening, and majority rules. Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung, 07–35. Mannheim.
- Dittmann, I., Maug, E. und Spalt, O. (2006). Executive stock options when managers are loss-averse. Mannheim.
- Degeorge, F. und Maug, E. (2008). Corporate finance in Europe : a survey. In Handbook of European financial markets and institutions (S. 217–237). Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press.
- Dittmann, I. und Maug, E. (2005). Warum optimale Anreizverträge keine Optionen enthalten. In Funktionsfähigkeit und Stabilität von Finanzmärkten (S. 1–20). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.